How not to defend ontological cheats by Krämer, Stephan
  
 
 
 
 
Krämer, S. (2010) How not to defend ontological cheats. Analysis, 70(2), pp. 290-296. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/140562/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 4 May 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
How not to defend ontological cheats 
STEPHAN KRÄMER 
– penultimate draft; please cite from original – 
Abstract: Jonathan Tallant (20091) argues against the view that ‘truth requires ground’ by trying 
to show that some theories which violate this principle are theoretically more virtuous than 
competitors respecting it, which gives us a good reason to reject the principle. I argue that 
Tallant’s argument is unsuccessful. 
 
1. Introduction 
Many metaphysicians are attracted to a thought I shall call the ‘grounding principle’: roughly 
speaking, that for every true proposition, there must be an object that grounds the truth, that 
makes it true. They sometimes advocate this principle as a way of ‘catching ontological 
cheaters’: theorists or theories endorsing claims without endorsing the ontology required by the 
truth of these claims. Jonathan Tallant tries to show that being a cheat (in the eyes of said 
metaphysicians) is not so bad: some theories – his examples are versions of actualism and 
presentism – violating the grounding principle offer significant advantages compared to their 
‘grounded’ competitors. He tries to show this by (among other things) arguing for the following 
theses: 
OP: Rejecting the grounding principle in favour of a weaker alternative allows us to account 
for the truth of modal and past-tensed claims in a more ontologically parsimonious way, 
namely without postulating modal or temporal ontology (i.e. non-actual objects and worlds, 
and non-present objects and times). (Cf. §§2–3) 
TV: The ontological parsimony gained by those theories violating the grounding principle is 
                                                 
1 In what follows, bare references to page numbers or sections are to this article. 
not counter-balanced by the comparative simplicity and elegance of their competitors since 
the latter kind of simplicity is not a genuine theoretical virtue, whereas ontological 
parsimony is. (Cf. §§6–7) 
It follows from OP and TV that, other things being equal, the cheat’s theories are to be preferred 
over the grounded alternatives. However, I think that Tallant’s arguments for OP and TV are 
unsuccessful. In §2 and §3, I present objections against Tallant’s defence of OP; §4 raises 
doubts concerning his argument for TV. 
 
2. The grounding principle and Tallant’s alternative 
Tallant provides the following explication of the grounding principle, which he ascribes to 
Bigelow (1988: 126): 
ST2: Necessarily, if <p> is true, it would be impossible for <p> to be false unless at least one 
entity which does not exist were to exist, and at least one entity which exists were not to 
exist. (422) 
This may not be a fortunate explication of the grounding principle for Tallant’s purposes, for it 
is not clear that it has the force he takes it to have when applied to modal propositions. Many 
philosophers think that possibility and necessity are not themselves contingent matters: if it is 
necessary (possible) that p, then it is necessarily necessary (possible) that p. If so, ST is trivially 
fulfilled for propositions of the form <possibly, p> and <necessarily, p> – if a proposition of 
this kind is true, it is impossible for it to be false, no matter what – and ST fails to yield a 
grounding requirement for such propositions. I suggest the following alternative: 
GP: Necessarily, for every true proposition (except negative existentials3), there is something 
                                                 
2 ‘ST’ stands for ‘supervenience thesis’; the label is Tallant’s. ‘<p>’ is to be read: the proposition that p. 
3 By contrast to what Tallant seems to assume (cf. 424), ST does not seem compatible with rejecting the 
which grounds it, which makes it true. 
(Spelling out the notion of grounding in such a way as to yield plausible results for modal 
claims is not trivial, but this seems to be a problem for those wishing to defend the grounding 
principle. Like Tallant, I shall also call the thing(s) grounding a given truth its ‘truthmaker(s)’.) 
 Tallant proposes that we deny the requirement for an ontological grounding of truths in 
some cases, in particular, ‘the modal and temporal cases’ (423). For example, instead of saying, 
as the proponent of GP does, that the truth of the proposition that there could have been a 
talking donkey requires that something makes it true – a merely possible talking of a donkey, 
say – we claim that the truth of this proposition ‘requires only that there could have existed the 
fact of there being a talking donkey’ (423, my italics). Similarly, instead of saying, as the 
proponent of GP does, that the truth of the proposition that Caesar crossed the Rubicon requires 
that something that makes it true – the past event of Caesar crossing the Rubicon, say – we 
claim that the truth of this proposition ‘requires only that there has existed the fact of Caesar’s 
crossing’ (423). 
 Instead of GP, then, which requires that (almost) every truth be accounted for in terms of 
the actual existence of a truthmaker, Tallant proposes we adopt a weaker alternative, which 
allows some of these truths to be accounted for in a different way: in terms of the merely 
possible or merely past existence of a truthmaker. Here is his attempt at formulating such a 
principle: 
NGC-ST4: a proposition is true if and only if, either: (a) there exists an entity that makes that 
proposition true; or (b) there does not exist an entity and that makes the proposition true; or 
(c) there could have existed an entity that would make the proposition true; or (d) there has 
                                                                                                                                                           
grounding principle for negative existentials: <There are no talking donkeys> is true in the actual world. 
According to ST, any world in which it is false must be a world in which something does not exist which 
actually does exist. Unless a truthmaker is needed for <there are no talking donkeys>, this seems false: there 
should be a world containing everything the actual world contains plus (at least) a talking donkey. 
4 ‘NGC’ stands for ‘no-ground cheating’, ‘ST’, as before, for ‘supervenience thesis’. The label is Tallant’s. 
existed an entity that makes the proposition true … (426)5 
This principle is unacceptable: it yields wildly implausible results and does not capture the view 
Tallant has in mind.6 The strategy of the cheat is supposed to be that of offering different kinds 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of different kinds of propositions. The right-
hand side of the bi-conditional then needs to distinguish these kinds of propositions. As it 
stands, clause (c), which surely is meant to deal with propositions of the form <possibly, p>, is 
satisfied by various propositions not of this form. For example, <some donkeys talk> satisfies 
(c) – there could have been something that would make it true – and thus is true according to 
NGC-ST. Moreover, even when restricted to the pertinent kind of proposition, some of the 
clauses need to be modified: For example, <possibly, some donkey talks> is supposed to be true 
because there could have been something that would make true not the proposition itself, as (c) 
would have it, but the embedded <some donkey talks>.7 Clause (b), meant to deal with negative 
existentials, needs modifying too. As it stands, it is not satisfied by anything, because its first 
conjunct – ‘there does not exist an entity’ – is trivially false.8  Plausibly, the clause should read: 
there does not exist an entity which makes the proposition false, i.e. which makes the embedded 
existential proposition true. (Cf. 424) 
 A closer look reveals further difficulties. We suggested that the clause for possibility 
statements should say: there could have been something that makes the embedded proposition 
true. However, this holds only where the embedded proposition is the kind of proposition that, 
                                                 
5 426, fn. 10 suggests that the dots are meant to indicate that the list might continue should the cheat find good 
reason to adopt the cheating strategy with respect to further kinds of propositions. 
6 Note also that NGC-ST is slightly odd as a replacement for ST: the latter is a strict conditional, whereas the 
former is a non-modal bi-conditional and thus not a supervenience thesis at all. Presumably, though, the 
principle is meant to survive modal strengthening and that it offers necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
proposition’s being true is hardly an objection. 
7 If, say, ‘there is a King of France’ expresses the same proposition at different times, with that proposition 
changing its truth value over time, then an analogous problem affects clause (d). – Similar problems arise for 
Tallant’s principles prefixed ‘NGC in the modal / temporal case’ on p. 423. 
8 Since none of the other clauses are conjunctive, one might conjecture that the ‘and’ is not meant to be there; the 
result of deleting it, however, would be the negation of clause (a), and NGC-ST would say that every 
proposition is true. 
if true, is made true by something according to the cheat. It does not hold, for example, if the 
embedded proposition is a negative existential: <possibly, there are no human beings> is not 
true because there could have been a truthmaker for <there are no human beings> but because 
there need not have been a truthmaker for the existential proposition embedded in the latter 
proposition. We can avoid this problem by adopting ‘possibly, the embedded proposition is true’ 
as the clause for possibility propositions, because this clause is neutral with regard to how the 
truth of the embedded proposition would be accounted for. My suggestion for how to go about 
repairing NGC-ST, then, is this: Call any proposition for which the cheat wants to require a 
truthmaker a TM-proposition. Let poss(x) and past(x) be functions from a proposition x to the 
proposition of the form <possibly, p> and <it was the case that p>, respectively, where x = <p>. 
The bi-conditional then reads: 
NGC-ST*: a proposition x is true iff: (a) x is a TM-proposition and there is something that 
makes x true; or (b) x is a negative existential and nothing makes the embedded existential 
proposition true; or (c) for some proposition y, x = poss(y) and y could have been true; or (d) 
for some proposition y, x = past(y) and y was true9; or … 
The dots indicate that the cheat may want to add further disjuncts, as I think he definitely 
should: For example, without extra clauses for conjunctive propositions, NGC-ST* requires 
truthmakers for propositions like <there are no talking donkeys and there are no talking 
monkeys> which seems implausible given that the conjuncts don’t require truthmakers. As it 
stands, NGC-ST* also does not seem to deal properly with negative statements about the past or 
what is possible. (Both problems also affect Tallant’s NGC-ST.) All this goes to show that there 
remains work for the cheat to do. Tallant has not offered a plausible substitute for GP that does 
the job he wants. 
                                                 
9 This assumes that the cheat’s propositions can change their truth value over time, so that <there is a King of 
France>, for example, was once true, but is now false. 
 3. Avoiding modal and temporal ontology 
There is another area where work remains to be done. Tallant wants to defend denying GP for 
‘the modal and the temporal cases’ (423). In order to succeed in this, he has to tell us how we 
are to account for all the modal and temporal truths without invoking unwanted ontology. He 
does tell us how we are to do this for the proposition that there could have been a talking 
donkey and the proposition that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. The strategy he uses generalises 
straightforwardly to all truths of the form <possibly, p> and <it was the case that p>, 
respectively – NGC-ST* in effect incorporates such a generalisation. Tallant appears to tacitly 
assume that either, these are all the relevant truths, or, that his strategy for handling these cases 
generalises equally straightforwardly to all the other cases. 
 In fact, both disjuncts of this assumption are false. The examples Tallant discusses do 
not (at least not explicitly) quantify over past objects or mere possibilia; they merely involve 
temporal and modal operators, which the proponent of GP reduces in terms of such 
quantification. Tallant’s strategy here is to refuse to make this reduction. This strategy does not 
apply in cases where the propositions whose truth is to be explained already quantify over 
temporal or modal ontology. Prima facie, there are true propositions of this kind. Suppose there 
were exactly n Emperors of Rome. (The example is Williamson’s (2002: 245).) How do we 
account for the truth of this proposition without invoking past objects? Tallant’s strategy could 
only be applied to this example if the logical form of the statement was ‘it was the case that: 
there are exactly n Emperors of Rome’. But it isn’t, its logical form is: ‘for n objects x: it was 
the case that x is Emperor of Rome’. Its truth therefore seems to require the existence of past 
objects. It has also been argued that many intuitively correct modal propositions cannot be 
expressed without quantifying over possibilia or possible worlds. Potential examples include: 
there could have been other things than there actually are (quantification over possibilia); there 
are three ways I could win this chess game (quantification over possible worlds).10 
 I conclude that Tallant’s defence of OP – the claim that violating the grounding principle 
lets us avoid a commitment to past objects and merely possible worlds – is incomplete: there 
are various kinds of intuitively true propositions apparently carrying such commitments to 
which the cheating strategy does not apply. 
 
4. Simple theories and simple worlds 
We now turn to TV, the second of Tallant’s claims I mentioned in the introduction. Assume for 
now that we have a cheating strategy which actually allows us to dispense with modal and 
temporal ontology. Tallant concedes that this benefit is not to be gained without paying a price: 
the cheat’s theory will be significantly more complicated than that of his opponent (call him the 
‘grounder’). (Cf. 426) One might therefore wonder why one should prefer cheating to 
grounding: might we not simply have a stand-off, where the theories mutual advantages and 
disadvantages cancel each other out? Tallant thinks not. He claims that the world postulated by 
the cheat is much simpler than that postulated by the grounder. (Cf. 426f) Drawing on a point of 
Joseph Melia’s (2000: 473f), he then concludes that as far as simplicity is concerned, the cheat’s 
theory is preferable, since the kind of simplicity we ought to value in theory choice is simplicity 
of the world postulated by the theory. But why should we accept that the cheat’s world is 
simpler than the grounder’s? 
 Since Tallant appeals to Melia’s paper, let us have a look at the pertinent passage. Melia 
compares two theories T1 and T2 describing spatial relations between physical objects. In order 
to do this, T1 uses an infinite stock of primitive distance predicates ‘x is-1-metre-from y’, ‘x is-
2-metres-from y’, etc., whereas T2 uses the three-place predicate ‘x is r metres from y’, where r 
ranges over the real numbers. While T2 is ontologically less parsimonious than T1, there is a 
                                                 
10 On these issues, see e.g. Melia 2003: ch. 2, Lewis 1986: 13ff. 
good sense in which T2 is a much simpler theory than T1. But, argues Melia, this simplicity 
attaches merely to ‘the formulation of the theory itself’ (2000: 473); it does not translate into 
simplicity of the world postulated by the theory. The argument crucially relies on the premise 
that even according to T2, the fact of a’s being 2 metres from b does not consist in a three-place 
relation obtaining between a, b, and the number 2. Therefore, ‘for all T2 says, it postulates no 
fewer fundamental distance relations than T1 and so there is no reason to suppose that the kind 
of world postulated by T2 is simpler than T1’ (2000: 473). All that the quantification over the 
real numbers allows T2 to do is generate predicates expressing the fundamental distance 
relations in a particularly simple and elegant way. As one might also put it, T1 and T2 agree 
about the nature of distance-facts, but only T2 invokes mathematical objects to describe those 
facts. 
 The situation of the grounder and the cheat is very different: the grounder does not 
appeal to modal and temporal ontology merely to generate the linguistic resources for 
describing a reality he and the cheat are in agreement about. The grounder thinks that the fact of 
Caesar having crossed the Rubicon consists in the existence of certain past objects; the cheat 
denies this. Grounder and cheat disagree about the nature of modal and temporal facts; they do 
not simply employ different methods for describing those facts. So Melia’s argument for 
disregarding a certain kind of complexity when choosing which theory to accept does not 
extend to the case Tallant is concerned with; Tallant owes us an argument for disregarding the 
complexity of the cheat’s theory. 
 To strengthen my point, I’ll try to make a prima facie case that we should not do that. 
The grounder’s world includes past objects and times, as well as merely possible objects and 
worlds. A world without those kinds of objects and otherwise like that of the grounder would 
certainly be simpler. But while the cheat’s world does not include those kinds of objects, it is 
not otherwise like that of the grounder. The grounder’s world (or perhaps: its fundamental level) 
can be exhaustively described by saying what kinds of things it contains. The cheat’s cannot. 
Let FG be the set of propositions the grounder accepts as fundamental truths about the world. 
Now remove those members from FG that postulate modal and temporal ontology; call the 
result F*. The cheat cannot accept F* as a complete account of how the world is at the 
fundamental level. He has to say that F* leaves out important facts about the world, those 
which concern what kinds of things it has, or could have, contained. In a good sense of 
‘complex’, I submit, he thinks that the world is more complex than F* has it. This sense of 
‘complex’ is relevant to theory choice: other things being equal, a theory on which the world is 
as F* has it is preferable to both the grounder’s and the cheat’s theory.11 So while the cheat’s 
world is simpler than the grounder’s in one respect, namely that of ontological complexity, it is 
more complex in another, which we might call propositional, or ideological, complexity. Both 
kinds of complexity are relevant to theory choice, and it is at best an open question whether 
cheat or grounder can claim a comparative advantage in terms of overall simplicity. Tallant has 
not established that cheating delivers the benefits he claims for it.12 
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